Abstract
We consider mating strategies for females who search for males sequentially during a season of limited length.
We show that the best strategy rejects a given male type if encountered before a time-threshold but accepts him after.
For frequency-independent benefits, we obtain the optimal time-thresholds explicitly for both discrete and continuous distributions of males, and allow for mistakes being made in assessing the correct male type. When the benefits are indirect (genes for the offspring) and the population is under frequency-dependent ecological selection, the benefits depend on the mating strategy of other females as well. This case is particularly relevant to speciation models that seek to explore the stability of reproductive isolation by assortative mating under frequency-dependent ecological selection. We show that the indirect benefits are to be quantified by the reproductive values of couples, and describe how the evolutionarily stable time-thresholds can be found. We conclude with an example based on the Levene model, where we analyze the evolutionarily stable assortative mating strategies and the strength of reproductive isolation provided by them.
Mate choice is a decisive process that shapes the genotypic distribution of populations in the course of evolution.
Females, who are often the active sex in mate choice, are faced with the task of selecting a male who gives the best chances for the production and survival of their progeny. In many species, the search for males is constrained to happen sequentially in time (Janetos 1980 , Real 1990 , Bakker and Milinski 1991 , Backwell and Passmore 1996 , Forsgren 1997 , Houde 1997 , Ivy and Sakaluk 2007 , Lehmann 2007 . In sequential search, the female faces a decision at each encounter with a male to be either satisfied with the male, in which case she accepts him for mating and terminates her search, or to decline him and continue searching for other males at the risk of running out of time. Ideally, the choice made at each encounter reflects the quality or quantity of benefits the encountered male is offering, where benefits could be either direct, e.g. a high-quality territory, nutrition, parental care or protection Jennions 2001, Andersson and Simmons 2006) or indirect, i.e., genes for the offspring Alatalo 1999, Andersson 2006 , Andersson and Simmons 2006) .
In the first part of this paper, we show that the best mating strategy, which maximizes the expected benefits for a sequentially searching female, is a particular time-threshold strategy. A female with a time-threshold strategy accepts a given male for mating if she encounters him after a time-threshold that depends on the type of the male. Some type(s) of males will have zero time-threshold, i.e., will be accepted from the beginning of the mating season, whereas others will be discriminated against by declining them until a time-threshold is passed. By the "best" mating strategy, we mean a globally evolutionarily stable strategy or the globally optimal strategy (sensu Metz et al. 2008 ), depending on whether selection is frequency-dependent or not. We derive the best time-thresholds for arbitrary variation among males, i.e., genetic or environmental, discrete or continuous, for both optimization and frequency-dependent selection on the mating strategies. The best time-thresholds are expressed in terms of benefits various male types are offering.
Females may however make mistakes in assessing a male. Such mistakes are incorporated in a natural way into our model, and we discuss the consequences of making mistakes via an example. Several theoretical papers have previously explored sequential mate search (e.g. Janetos 1980 , Real 1990 In the second part of the paper, we focus on indirect benefits in populations where frequency-dependent ecological selection maintains the genetic polymorphism. We show how evolutionarily stable mating strategies can be found, and illustrate the method using a population genetic model where heterozygotes are selected against and conditions for ecological speciation are met. We investigate the stability of assortative mating that arises from homozygote females discriminating against the opposite homozygote or heterozygote males, investigate the conditions under which polymorphism is maintained (nonrandom mating implies sexual selection, which can interfere with ecological selection in maintaining the polymorphism), and explore when reproductive isolation between homozygotes is strong enough to maintain separate species.
The Model
Consider a large and well-mixed sexually reproducing population with k different types of males present. These types may represent any kind of variation, including genotypes or non-hereditary phenotypes. The type distribution may also be continuous; formulas for this case are given in Supporting Information S2. Females (the choosy sex) encounter males (who are always ready to mate) sequentially, such that at each encounter with a male, the female must either accept the male for mating and terminate her search or decline the male and continue searching. If a female of type f accepts a male of type g for mating, she will receive a positive benefit ε f,g .
Encounters occur randomly at a rate λ during a mating season of length T . Importantly, the encounter rate depends on population density, because it is easier to find a male in a more dense population; we ease the notation by using λ for the encounter rate evaluated at the equilibrium density. Females who remain unmated till the end of the mating season cannot reproduce.
TIME-THRESHOLDS AS PREFERENCE TRAITS
Suppose that at time t in the mating season, a female f encounters a male of type g. In a sequential search, she has only two possible decisions: accept or reject. Thus the most general strategy the female may follow is to accept the male with probability Π f,g (t) and to reject with probability 1−Π f,g (t). The benefit that this strategy yields on average
, where E f (t) denotes the benefit an unmated female of type f can expect to receive in the remainder of the mating season. B f,g (t) is a simple linear function of Π f,g (t), so that the best
The female thus accepts the male if he provides a greater benefit than what the female can expect if she continues searching.
LetP m denote the frequency of male type g m in the mating season (the symbol P m is reserved for frequency at birth, see below). In Supporting Information S1, we show that the expected benefit of females who are still unmated at time t, E f (t), changes according tȯ
with E f (T ) = 0 (at the end of the mating season, unmated females receive no benefit). Equation (2) is an extended version of the sequential search (or one-step decision) tactic introduced in Janetos (1980) and further developed in Real (1990) , Wiegmann et al. (1999) , Wiegmann and Angeloni (2007) .
the expected benefit of unmated females, E f (t), decreases throughout the mating season towards E f (T ) = 0. If E f (0) > ε f,gi for a given male type such that, according to equation (1), the female should not accept males of this type at the beginning of the season, then there is a single timethreshold τ f,gi such that ε f,gi > E f (t) holds for all t > τ f,gi and the female should accept the male if she encounters him at any time after τ f,gi (see Figure 1 ). If ε f,gi > E f (0), then τ f,gi = 0, as ε f,gi exceeds the expected benefit at all times and the male should be accepted right from the beginning of the mating season. For convenience, we index the male types in decreasing order of benefits, ε f,g1 ≥ ε f,g2 ≥ ... ≥ ε f,g k (note that this ordering may depend on the female), which implies τ f,g1 ≤ τ f,g2 ≤ ... ≤ τ f,g k , i.e., better males are accepted earlier in the season. Obviously, the adding these up given that the female hasn't terminated her search. Because 1 − e −λ(ti+1−ti) i j=1P j is the probability that acceptable males of types {g 1 , . . . , g i } are encountered between t i and t i+1 andP m i j=1P j is the probability that a particular type g m is encountered out of the types {g 1 , . . . , g i }, we have that a female f mates with a male of type g m with probability
randomly, but some females do. Note that by equation (1), the best time-threshold strategy is better than any other conceivable mating strategy. Hence if condition (7) holds, no strategy is better than random mating; and the opposite of (7) is necessary for the evolution of any form of preferential mating.
MISTAKES IN EVALUATING MALES
Females may naturally make mistakes in estimating the correct type of the male. To incorporate such mistakes, we need to characterize the males not by their true type, but by their perceived type. For example, a male is of the type "good-looking" either if the female assesses a good-quality male correctly or if a bad-quality male deceives the female so that she believes him to be good. Males of perceived type g vary in the real benefit they provide. We can however use the above results simply by substituting the mean of the real benefit from males of perceived type g for ε f,g . With this, equation (3) yields the time-thresholds for females to accept males based on their perceived type, i.e., based on the information available to females. (Note however that with this, equation (5) gives the probabilities of mating with perceived types, not with true types. Supporting Information S1 explains how the probability of mating with a certain true type can be obtained.)
If mistakes are common, then the mean benefits from different perceived male types are similar to each other, because different perceived types are almost random samples from the entire male population. In this case, inequality (7) holds and random mating is the best mating strategy. In other words, females do not discriminate among the perceived male types when the available information is too unreliable.
Examples for optimal mating strategies
If the benefits ε f,g are constants, then the best time-thresholds of a given female are independent of what other females do. Finding the best mating strategy thus reduces to an evolutionary optimization problem sensu Metz et al. (2008) .
Here we give three simple examples for this case, assuming that all females are equal, whereas males and the benefits they give vary due to some environmental effects such as the quality of the microhabitat where the males grew up.
Example 1: Good vs bad males. Suppose that a fraction p g of males are of good condition and able to provide ε g offspring, whereas the remaining p b = 1 − p g fraction of males are of bad condition and can provide only ε b < ε g offspring (since we assume all females to be equal, we suppress the female index f ). Females can ascertain whether a male is good or bad without mistakes. The females should obviously accept a good male at any time, and therefore the only trait of interest is the time-threshold after which females accept also the bad males. Taking i = k in equation
provided that this is positive; otherwise the females should accept also the bad males at any time. The threshold τ b is high, i.e., discrimination against bad males is strong, when the difference between the benefits is large (relative to ε b ) and when encounters occur often and the good males are frequent such that females discriminating against the bad males do not run a high risk of remaining unmated.
Example 2: Mistakes in determining male type. Now we expand the above example allowing for mistakes that females might make in determining whether a male is good or bad. Suppose that with probability q < 1 2 , a good male the female perceives as bad, and with the same probability a bad male she perceives as good (in case q > 1 2 , the females should just make the opposite decisions). We assume the same probability for the two mistakes for simplicity, and hence consider situations where the mistake is due to extrinsic reasons such as visual constrains (e.g. turbid water, Seehausen et al. 1997 ), rather than due to male deception.
From the females' point of view, males are "good-looking" or "bad-looking", and these males occur with frequency π g = p g (1 − q) + p b q and π b = p b (1 − q) + p g q, respectively. The benefit a good-looking male provides on average is
It is easy to check that goodlooking males give on average higher benefits (η g > η b ), and therefore females should always accept good-looking males. The optimal time-threshold after which females should accept bad-looking males, τ b , is calculated as in the previous example, but usingP 1 = π g ,P 2 = π b , and E k f = η b ; note that the average benefitĒ k f = π g η g + π b η b simplifies toĒ k f = p g ε g + p b ε b as above. This yields
As in the previous example, strong discrimination evolves when the difference ε g − ε b is large (relative to ε b ) and when λ is high. τ b decreases with increasing q, i.e., mistakes make the optimal discrimination less strong; this is because bad-looking males may well be good when mistakes are frequent. The effect of p g is slightly more complicated (see Figure 2) . At low values of p g , τ b increases with p g and therefore discrimination against bad males becomes stronger; this is similar to the case without mistakes, but an additional factor is that at low p g , most good-looking males are in fact of the common bad type, only mistaken for good, and therefore should not be preferred (thus random mating for very low p g , Figure 2 ). At high values of p g , however, τ b decreases with the frequency of good males. This may seem counterintuitive because a higher frequency of good males should allow the females to be more discriminative against bad males without running the risk of remaining unmated. However, if bad males are rare, it is increasingly likely that a bad-looking male is in fact a good male, and therefore it doesn't pay off to discriminate against it.
Example 3: Continuous male type-distribution. If the distribution of male types is continuous, then the best timethresholds of a female f are specified by a function τ f (g) such that the female accepts a male of type g if she encounters him at a time t > τ f (g) during the mating season. We derive the best time-threshold function for the general model in Supporting Information S2. Figure 3 shows two examples, one with uniform and one with log-normal distribution of male types, and with ε f (g) = g (note that this differs from the reverse ordering we used for the discrete case where low values of g provided the highest benefits). If the males are uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1], then we can obtain the optimal time-threshold function analytically (see Supporting Information S2),
which is depicted in Figure 3a . Males with benefit higher than g 0 = λT 2+λT have zero threshold, i.e., they are accepted from the beginning of the mating season. Notice that in this example, the females should never mate randomly; in particular, the worst male g = 0 is not accepted until time T . This is because at any time before T , the female has a chance to encounter a male with a positive benefit, and therefore she should not terminate her search with accepting a male with no benefit. Notice further that the time-threshold function τ f (g) is concave down, which means that the discrimination between two similar male types is greater when both males are of better quality than when they are of the worse quality. In the beginning of the mating season, the females do not have a high risk of remaining unmated and therefore take a longer time during which they discriminate between males of similar qualities; but towards the end of the mating season, the females accept worse males sooner.
In Figure 3b , we assume the biologically more realistic log-normal distribution of male types,
In this case, the solution has to be evaluated numerically (Supporting Information S2), but its qualitative features are the same as with the uniform distribution.
Frequency-dependent indirect benefits
In the remainder of this paper, we assume that the male types correspond to genotypes and that the benefits the males provide are the genes inherited by the offspring. We also assume that the offspring undergo frequency-dependent viability (ecological) selection, which maintains the polymorphism. This raises two difficulties in quantifying the benefits and finding the best time-thresholds. Firstly, the offspring are of various genotypes, and therefore the number of offspring is not an appropriate measure of the benefit a female receives from a male; it is possible that the couple would have many offspring but these do not survive, or survive to reproduction but are then unable to find mates with whom they can reproduce successfully. In the first subsection below, we show that the benefit ε f,g is given by the reproductive value of the f, g couple. Secondly, the fitness of a given offspring genotype depends on the genotypic frequencies in the offspring population, and therefore the benefit from a given male to a given female depends on the mating preferences of other females. This means that the benefits ε f,g are not constants but depend on the mating strategy followed by the resident population. Our results enable us to determine whether certain time-thresholds are the best for an individual female assuming that all other females follow the same strategy. In the second subsection below, we discuss how this can be used to determine the evolutionarily stable mating strategy (ESS).
REPRODUCTIVE VALUES AS INDIRECT BENEFITS
Consider first a population with non-overlapping generations. If males contribute only their genes to the offspring, then the benefit a female f receives from a male g is the number of her offspring who survive and reproduce, weighted with the eventual success accrued from each reproducing offspring. The benefit is thus given by
where 2K is the number of offspring (K daughters and K sons), R f,g→r is the probability that parents with genotypes f and g produce an offspring with genotype r according to the Mendelian rules for autosomal loci, and v r is the probability of survival of an offspring of genotype r. Importantly, v r may be density-and frequency-dependent. 1 2 Q r,hPh is the probability that the offspring is a female and that she gets mated with a male h, whereas 1 2 Q h,rPh is the probability that the offspring is a male times the expected number of females of genotype h he is mated with.
For time-threshold mating strategies, these quantities are given by equation (5) . The weights attached to the offspring, ε r,h 2 and ε h,r 2 , respectively, are halved because the offspring will pass the focal female's gene with probability 1 2 . Equation (12) is valid only at equilibrium, where the density-and frequency-dependent survival probabilities and the benefits are constants across generations. Because R f,g→r = R g,f →r , the benefits are symmetric such that ε f,g = ε g,f (but Q f,g is generally different from Q g,f ). In Supporting Information S3, we show that the benefit given in (12) is the reproductive value of the couple f, g and generalize equation (12) 
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE MATING STRATEGIES
Since in any population the best mating strategy is a time-threshold strategy (cf. equation (1)), all evolutionarily stable strategies must be time-threshold strategies. To determine the evolutionarily stable time-thresholds, we assume non-overlapping generations (the extension to iteroparous organisms is tedious but straightforward). Let P g denote the frequency of genotype g at birth, and let N be population size. To calculate the genotype frequencies after selection, we define w g = vḡ v , the relative viability of genotype g, wherev = g P g v g is the average probability of survival; and sincew = g P g w g = 1, the frequency of genotype g after ecological selection and before mating is P g = P g wḡ w = P g w g . v g and therefore w g depend on N and on P 1 , ..., P k .
Suppose that all females of the resident population mate using the (not necessarily best) time-thresholds t 1 , ..., t k .
This resident population equilibrates at a population size and genotype frequencies that satisfy
where Q g,h is given in (5) with λ evaluated at the equilibrium density N andQ = g,hP gPh Q g,h is the fraction of females who mated by the end of the season.
Let us focus attention on an individual female in the equilibrium resident population. The benefits she obtains are determined by equation (12) evaluated at the resident equilibrium of N, P 1 , ..., P k . If the time-thresholds t 1 , ..., t k are actually the best possible time-thresholds for an individual female who lives in this resident population, then they coincide with the time-thresholds obtained from equation (3). If it is so, then no other (mutant) mating strategy could invade this resident population, and therefore the resident time-thresholds correspond to an ESS. To determine the ESS time-thresholds, therefore, we need to solve equations (13) and (12) simultaneously for the unknowns N, P 1 , ..., P k and ε f,g for f, g = 1, ..., k, substituting throughout the time-thresholds from equation (3) and Q f,g from (5) with λ evaluated at N . Once the solution of (12) is known, the ESS time-thresholds are obtained by substituting the benefits into (3). Since the equations are nonlinear, multiple solutions may exist, yielding multiple ESSs for the same model parameters. A further complication is that even though equation (3) gives the time-thresholds to be used in (5) explicitly, it supposes that we know, for each female genotype, the ranking of male genotypes (recall that male types must be indexed in decreasing order of benefits) and the number of male types n f accepted by a female genotype f from the beginning of the mating season. Since with frequency-dependence this depends on the solution itself, one has to check each possible configuration of male rankings and n f values separately, calculating the solution for a hypothetised configuration and checking whether the time-thresholds of the solution reproduce the configuration assumed. Every solution found gives a mating strategy τ f,g for all f, g and the corresponding population equilibrium N, P 1 , ..., P k , where the evolutionary stability of τ f,g is guaranteed by the fact that equation (3) yields the best time-thresholds, but the population dynamical stability of N, P 1 , ..., P k (with the time-thresholds fixed) must be checked separately using the standard method of linear stability analysis.
Example: assortative mating in the Levene model
To demonstrate the method of finding the evolutionarily stable mating strategy under frequency-dependent selection,
we consider a population that undergoes viability selection according to the multiple niche polymorphism model of Levene (1953) . We assume that there are two habitats of equal size that support a population of fixed size (hence N is constant). Two alleles, a and A, segregate in a single locus so that the possible genotypes are aa, aA and AA. The relative viabilities in the Levene model are given by
where u (i) g is the probability of survival for genotype g in habitat i, and U i = g P g u (i) g is the average survival probability in habitat i. w g is frequency-dependent because U 1 and U 2 depend on the genotype frequencies. For simplicity, we assume symmetric selection, i.e., u
AA = 1 such that homozygotes aa (AA) are selected against in habitat 2 (in habitat 1) with the same selection coefficient s, and u
such that heterozygotes are selected against equally in both habitats (Hoekstra et al. 1985) . Figure   4 shows the selection regimes in this model under random mating.
We restrict our analysis to symmetric equilibria (P aa =P AA ). Since half of the offspring of heterozygote females are heterozygote and the other half homozygote, and the two homozygote genotypes are under equal selection at the symmetric equilibrium, we have ε aA,aa = ε aA,aA = ε aA,AA ; this implies that heterozygote females do not benefit from any preference and thus their best strategy is random mating, τ aA,aa = τ aA,aA = τ aA,AA = 0. Moreover, at the symmetric equilibrium we have ε aa,aa = ε AA,AA , which means that we have just four unknowns in equations (12) and (13), ε aa,aa , ε aa,aA , ε aa,AA andP aa (recall that ε f,g = ε g,f ). Due to symmetry, the best time-thresholds are also symmetric, τ 1 = τ aa,aa = τ AA,AA , τ 2 = τ aa,aA = τ AA,aA and τ 3 = τ aa,AA = τ AA,aa , such that the two homozygote females discriminate equally against the opposite homozygote males and also equally against the heterozygote males.
We aim this analysis at understanding the degree and stability of reproductive isolation by assortative mating. For this reason, we confine ourselves to ESSs where homozygote females benefit most from mating with identical homozygotes and least from the opposite homozygotes (ε aa,aa ≥ ε aa,aA ≥ ε aa,AA ), thereby disregarding situations where the production of heterozygotes is favoured and disassortative mating evolves. We therefore consider only three configurations of mating strategies for homozygote females (f = aa or AA): random mating (RM ) with τ 1 = τ 2 = τ 3 = 0 (all males accepted equally; n f = 3); partial assortative mating (P AM ) with τ 1 = τ 2 = 0 and τ 3 > 0 (opposite homozygotes discriminated; n f = 2); and assortative mating (AM ) with τ 1 = 0 and 0 < τ 2 ≤ τ 3 (heterozygotes and opposite homozygotes discriminated; n f = 1 and heterozygote males rank higher than opposite homozygotes).
For these three configurations, we solved equations (12) and (13) (supplemented with (5) If heterozygotes are at an advantage during ecological selection (h < 1/2), then there is either AM or N AM S.
The reason is that with RM or P AM , heterozygote males are not discriminated against by the females and hence suffer no disadvantage either in ecological selection or in sexual selection. With AM strategies, however, females do discriminate against heterozygote males, and when this sexual selection is sufficiently strong, it can override ecological selection and lead to an overall disadvantage of heterozygotes, thus making AM an evolutionarily stable mating strategy. This mechanism can stabilize reproductive isolation upon secondary contact even if the hybrids are at an ecological advantage.
The conditions under which random mating (RM ) is evolutionarily stable can be obtained analytically (see Supporting Information S4). These conditions hold when λT is small, so that rejecting a male runs a high risk of remaining unmated; and also when h is close to 1 2 , so that all genotypes have similar viabilities (but at high λT , this region becomes too narrow to be seen in Figure 5 ). When h exceeds h int = (2− √ 4 − 4s − s 2 )/(2s), the RM equilibrium loses its population genetic stability, whereas above h 0 = 1/(2 − s), the RM and P AM polymorphisms are not protected.
Increasing λT increases the time-thresholds τ 2 and τ 3 of the AM/AM + strategy, so that homozygote females increasingly discriminate against other genotypes (but the same is not true for the AM − strategy). As discrimination increases, the frequency of each homozygote approaches 1/2 and the heterozygotes disappear. We measure the strength of reproductive isolation between the homozygotes by comparing the frequency of heterozygotes at birth to the frequency of heterozygotes under random mating, i.e., using the statistic F = 1 − P aA 2PaP A = 1 − 2P aA (since P a = P A = 1 2 at the symmetric equilibrium). When the homozygote females adopt the AM/AM + strategy, F exceeds 0.99 in the shaded area in Figure 5 . With strong heterozygote disadvantage during ecological selection (high s and high h), even a P AM strategy can sustain reproductive isolation (F > 0.99 for P AM in the darkly shaded area in Figure 5b ), because heterozygotes are so rare during mating that discrimination against the opposite homozygotes alone suffices to maintain reproductive isolation. We thus conclude that with a sufficiently long mating season, reproductive isolation by assortative mating is evolutionarily stable.
Discussion
We have determined the best mating strategy for females who search for mates sequentially. We have shown that the best mating strategy is always a time-threshold strategy, such that a given female rejects a given type of male if she encounters him before a certain point in time during the mating season and accepts him after (this time-threshold may also be zero, meaning that the female accepts the male at any time). We have derived the best time-thresholds for both discrete and continuous male type distributions, calculated the probabilities that a given female will mate with a particular male type, and gave a condition under which non-random mating should evolve.
If the benefits are direct, as in our first set of examples, then the model reduces to an optimization model where time-thresholds always evolve to the values given by the best time-thresholds strategy. For the case of indirect benefits, i.e., when males contribute their genes to the success of the female's offspring, we have shown that the reproductive value of the couple is the appropriate measure of the benefit. We then embedded the sequential mate search model into a population genetic model of speciation, and established the conditions under which reproductive isolation by assortative mating is evolutionarily stable.
Females may make mistakes when assessing the type of the male. These mistakes are easily incorporated into our model by characterizing the males not by their true type but by their perceived type. We found that the distribution of true male types (p g in Figure 2 ) influences whether females should discriminate among males in a somewhat surprising manner: When good males are common, it is not worth to discriminate against bad-looking males, even though finding a good male would not be difficult. This is because if bad males are rare, mistakes occur more often than encounters with bad males, i.e., it is quite likely that a bad-looking male is in fact a good male. On the other hand, if good males are rare, then the females should accept any mates or else they remain unmated. The females therefore should mate at random whenever they are prone to make mistakes and the frequencies of good and bad males are far from equal. In interspecific hybridization, conspecifics are usually "good" and heterospecifics "bad". Our result is thus in agreement with the so-called Hubbs principle, which states that hybridization occurs more often when one of the species is rare (Hubbs 1955 , Mayr 1963 , Grant and Grant 1997 , Randler 2002 , and explains the puzzling fact that also females of the common species, who could easily find conspecific males, are often found in hybrid pairs (Randler 2002 ).
The best time-thresholds could be found by maximizing the expected benefit (given in equation (6)) with respect to t 1 , ..., t k (for a continuous male type distribution, the same can be done using the calculus of variations, see e.g. Sagan 1992; Parvinen et al. 2006 ). We offer a more efficient way to find the best time-thresholds, which yields the explicit formula in equation (3). The globally optimal or (under frequency-dependent selection) globally evolutionarily stable mating strategies we have found are valid for any kind of variation, i.e., irrespectively whether the mating strategies In this article, we did not purse the dynamics of evolution leading to an evolutionarily stable mating strategy, which would be affected by all these details.
Our model addresses several issues that have received little attention in recent models of assortative mating and speciation. Firstly, it is often assumed that females have a fixed level of choosiness throughout the mating season. This is the case, for example, in the highly influential model of Gavrilets and Boake (1998) (Tsitrone et al. 2003) . To account for this, Kopp and Hermisson (2008) assumed that at their very last encounter, females accept any male, but otherwise choosiness is constant. Our model quantitatively predicts how females should become less choosy as the mating season progresses. There is always a period at the end of the mating season when females should accept any male (unless some matings result in no offspring at all). If the mating season is short relative to the rate of encountering males, then random mating is the best strategy throughout the mating season (see inequality (7) ).
Secondly, many speciation models assume self-referent assortative mating, where females prefer males that are similar to themselves with respect to the ecological trait (Doebeli 1996 Thirdly, most of the recent assortative mating models assume that each female can encounter a fixed number of males before the mating season runs out, or that there is no maximum number of encounters and all females are mated (see references above). In reality, the number of males a female encounters depends on population density and is affected by the stochasticity inherent in the search process. Our model incorporates both of these factors naturally by assuming that mate search is a Poisson process with a density-dependent encounter rate λ. It is also straightforward to extend the model such that λ depends on female type. For example, if mate sampling is costly due to time and energy expenditures (Thornhill 1984 , Slagsvold et al. 1988 , Alatalo et al. 1988 , Milinski and Bakker 1992 or due to increased risk of predation Belwood 1984, Forsgren 1992 ), a female better adapted to the environment might bear the costs easier and sample more mates Petrie 1997, Cotton et al. 2006) . In the Levene model with disruptive ecological selection (h > 1/2), we found that an ESS with nearly perfect reproductive isolation exists if females encounter on average about 10 males during the mating season ( Figure 5, shaded area), provided that the polymorphism is maintained. This number is roughly in agreement with the results of Kopp and Hermisson (2008), who assumed a fixed number of encounters and self-referent assortative mating in a different ecological model. There are, however, two facts that complicate matters. Firstly, genetic polymorphism may be lost due to the positively frequency-dependent sexual selection that is induced by assortative mating (see Matessi et al. 2001 ). If ecological selection is weak, then the polymorphism is stable only if a large number of males is encountered; for s = 0.05, this raises the necessary number of encounters to about 20. Secondly, the model can have alternative evolutionarily stable strategies without strong reproductive isolation at the same parameter values where an ESS with reproductive isolation exists. This happens when ecological selection is strong (Figure 5b ) so that, surprisingly, weaker selection may sometimes be more conducive to reproductive isolation because then the alternative evolutionarily stable strategies are absent.
[68] Wiegmann, D. D., K. Mukhopadhyay, and L. A. Real. 1999 A particular solution to equation (2) which describes how the expected benefit E f (t) changes throughout the mating season. ε i abbreviates ε f,gi , and similarly τ i abbreviates τ f,gi . Males with types g 1 , . . . , g n offer higher benefits than the initial expectation E f (0), i.e. ε 1 ≥ · · · ≥ ε n > E(0), and therefore they are accepted right from the beginning of the mating season. Males with type g i offer higher benefits than the female is expected to receive in the future only after the time-threshold τ i . To receive the maximum benefits, the female hence should reject male g i before time τ i and accept after τ i . The expression for τ i is given in equation (3). (P aa ,P aA ,P AA ) = ( 1 4 , 1 2 , 1 4 ) is stable. In panel A, near the fixation equilibria (P a = 0 or P A = 0) the heterozygotes have higher viability fitness than the common homozygotes so that the polymorphism is protected. Because the heterozygotes do better also at equal allele frequencies, selection is stabilizing at the symmetric equilibrium. In panel B, near the fixation equilibria selection is similar to panel A, but at equal allele frequencies the heterozygotes do worse than homozygotes, hence ecological selection is disruptive at the symmetric equilibrium. The symmetric equilibrium is globally stable in A and B. In C and D heterozygotes do worse than homozygotes at all allele frequencies and both fixation equilibria are stable. However, in C there exists a stable symmetric equilibrium (unprotected polymorphism) whereas in D the symmetric equilibrium is unstable and polymorphism is not maintained (not shown). In area C, the polymorphism is hence unprotected whereas in area D polymorphism is not maintained. In the middle panel, areas B (see Supporting Information S4 for derivation). The dashed vertical lines mark the values of s used in Figure 5 . Note that this figure would look different for non-random mating, because the genotype distribution is then different. explanation. Note that in (a), h 0 = 0.5882 and h int = 0.5896, so that the RM U P region in-between is too narrow to be seen. Figure 3 : Figure 5 :
E(t)
the frequencies of true types areP T 1 , ...,P T k T . Let q ij be the probability that a female evaluates a male of true type h j as a male of perceived type g i . The probability that a female f eventually mates with a male of true type h i is given by
where Q f,gj is from equation (5), r ij is the probability that a male of perceived type g j is of true type h i , given by Bayes' theorem,
and from the identity r ijPj = q jiP T i , the frequencies of perceived types arẽ
(S1.6c)
Equations (S1.6) express the mating probabilities among true types in terms of the frequencies of true types (which derive from the ecological model that describes the origin of variation) and the probabilities of making mistakes, q ij . Note that the probabilities q ij (or even the number of perceived male types) may depend on the female's type f . In this case, r ij and the frequencies of perceived types (P i ) are different for different female types, but the formulas above can be used for each female type separately.
Supporting Information 2: Continuous distribution of male types
Suppose that the male type g has a continuous distribution with a probability density function p(g). In this case, the best mating strategy of female f is specified by a function τ f (g), which gives the time-threshold after which the female should accept a male of type g. Let ε f (g) denote the benefit a female f receives if she mates with a male of type g; we assume that the benefit is a continuously differentiable function of male type. Equation (2) directly generalizes to the continuous case in the forṁ
As in the discrete case, a female should start accepting a male of type g when the benefit from this male equals the benefit she can expect if she keeps searching, i.e., we have
Differentiating both sides of this equation yieldsĖ f (τ f (g))τ f (g) = ε f (g) (where prime denotes differentiation with respect to g). SubstitutingĖ f from (S2.1) and using (S2.2) again yields
The right hand side of this differential equation contains only known functions and therefore can readily be integrated to obtain τ f (g) up to a constant. To find the integration constant, one possibility is to (numerically) integrate equation (S2.1) with E f (T ) = 0, and find a male type g 0 such that ε f (g 0 ) = E f (0); then we have τ f (g 0 ) = 0, and we can use this as the initial value to go with the differential equation in (S2.3). There is a simpler way (not involving an integral with the max function in (S2.1)) to find the integration constant if the benefit has a global minimum at some male type g * (i.e., if ε f (g * ) ≤ ε f (g) for all g in the support of the male type distribution). If ε f (g * ) > 0 such that even the worst male type gives a positive benefit, then there is a time interval [τ f (g * ), T ] of positive length at the end of the mating season when max{E f (t), ε f (g)} = ε f (g) for all g and the female should accept all males. Integrating equation (S2.1) over this interval of time yields
dg is the expected benefit from a random male (this result is analogous to equation (3) of the case of discrete male types, withĒ f =Ē k f and i = k). If ε f (g * ) = 0, then τ f (g * ) = T . The solution of equation (S2.3) can be negative for those male types g who should be accepted from the beginning of the mating season. As in the discrete case, these negative values must be truncated to zero. Since the right hand side of equation (S2.3) does not depend on τ f , the truncation has no effect on the non-negative part of the solution.
Suppose now that ε f (g) = g and g assumes only non-negative values. In this case, equation (S2.3) simplifies to
with the initial value τ f (0) = T , so we have the solution explicitly as
If the benefits are uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1], then
and the solution simplifies to
The optimal time-threshold is given by this formula when its value is positive, and zero otherwise (cf. equation (10) in the main text; Figure 3a ). If the benefits follow the lognormal distribution (equation (11) in the main text), then the integrals in formula (S2.6) must be evaluated numerically to obtain τ f (g) as shown in Figure 3b .
Supporting Information 3: Reproductive values as indirect benefits

REPRODUCTIVE VALUES
Let N f g (t) denote the number of couples where the female and the male have genotypes f and g, respectively and let N = [N 11 , N 12 , . . . , N 1k , N 21 , . . . ] T . Recall that a male can mate several times and can thus be part of several couples. The population dynamics are given by the matrix model
The two terms of this expression correspond to the daughters and the sons of the couple (f, g), respectively, who become half of a couple (r, h) a generation later. At equilibrium, the elements of A are constants and the dominant eigenvalue of A is 1. The (f g)'th element of the dominant left eigenvector of A,
is the benefit that a female f receives from being part of a couple (f, g), as given by equation (12) in the main text. Equation (12) determines the benefits only up to a constant, but this is irrelevant to finding the best time-thresholds as they depend only on the ratios of benefits. The elements of the left eigenvector are the reproductive values of the corresponding couples (Caswell 2006 
INDIRECT BENEFITS FOR A SINGLE LOCUS UNDER RANDOM MATING
For a single locus under random mating, the reproductive value of a couple simplifies to the expected viability fitness of their offspring. To see this, recall that under random mating, the probability that a female f is mated to a male g is the probability that she is mated at all times the frequency of genotype g, i.e., using the notation introduced at equation (13) in the main text, Q f,gPg =QP g , from which we obtain that Q f,g =Q is the same for all f, g. Equation (12) therefore simplifies to
Since at equilibrium KvQ = 1 (cf. equation (13)), Kv rQ equals the relative viability fitness w r = vr v and we have 
MAINTENANCE OF ASSORTATIVE MATING
In the Levene model, two mechanisms maintain assortative mating by stabilizing the AM strategy: ecological selection against heterozygotes (for h > 1 2 only) and sexual selection against heterozygotes (by the AM strategy itself; see main text). When the strength of ecological selection is moderate, then it is mainly sexual selection that disfavours heterozygote males and therefore h has little effect on whether an AM strategy is evolutionarily stable; in Figure 5a , the thick line, which separates the region where the AM strategy is stable, is almost vertical. When ecological selection is strong, then a disadvantage of heterozygotes (h > 1 2 ) facilitates AM , whereas an advantage of heterozygotes (h < 1 2 ) hinders it (Figure 5b) .
At h = 1 2 , all genotypes have equal viabilities at the symmetric equilibrium so that whether or not the AM solution exists is independent of the strength of selection. However, the stability of this solution with respect to perturbing the genotype frequencies still depends on s (see below) such that with weaker selection, stable solutions exist only at higher λT (compare Figure 5a and 
b).
At h = 1 2 , also reproductive isolation reaches the level F = 0.99 at the same value of λT irrespectively of s, provided that the polymorphism is stable in the population genetic sense. When heterozygotes are at a disadvantage during ecological selection (h > 1 2 ), stronger selection facilitates reproductive isolation because heterozygote disadvantage selects for stronger discrimination. For h < 1 2 , this effect is the reverse, yet sexual selection from assortative mating alone can lead to strong reproductive isolation if λT is sufficiently high.
PROTECTED VERSUS UNPROTECTED POLYMORPHISMS
A polymorphism is protected if the fixation equilibria are unstable. In this section, we investigate the stability of the fixation equilibrium (P aa ,P aA ,P AA ) = (1, 0, 0) with respect to perturbations of the genotype frequencies for RM , P AM and AM mating strategies with fixed time-thresholds (by symmetry, the stability conditions of the opposite fixation equilibrium (P aa ,P aA ,P AA ) = (0, 0, 1) are the same).
The fixation equilibrium (P aa ,P aA ,P AA ) = (1, 0, 0) is unstable when the marginal fitness of allele A in a population monomorphic for allele a exceeds 1, i.e., when W a (A) = 1 2 Q aa,aA + Q aA,aa Q aa,aa w aA > 1, (S4.1) (Kisdi and Priklopil 2011). In this condition, w aA is to be evaluated at the fixation equilibrium, which in the Levene model yields
Q aa,aA , Q aA,a and Q aa,aa , defined in equation (5), are evaluated at the fixation equilibrium using the time-thresholds of the RM , P AM and AM mating strategies as follows:
RM: Under random mating, Q aa,aA = Q aA,aa = Q aa,aa = 1 − e −λT , and condition (S4.1) is reduced to W a (A) = w aA > 1. Using (S4.2), this can be written as
PAM: Under partial assortative mating with time-thresholds t 1 = t 2 = 0 and t 3 > 0, equation (5) which reduces to Q aa,aA = Q aA,aa = Q aa,aa = 1 − e −λT when evaluated at (P aa ,P aA ,P AA ) = (1, 0, 0). The condition for stability is thus the same as in the RM case, see (S4.3). This result is intuitive, since under both RM and P AM , the homozygote females do not discriminate against the heterozygote males and therefore mating does not influence the marginal fitness of the rare allele.
AM: Under assortative mating with time-thresholds t 1 = 0 and t 2 , t 3 > 0, equation (5) for the instability of the fixation equilibrium with w aA given in (S4.2). For t 2 > 0 we have w aA > W a (A), so that the fixation equilibrium is easier unstable (i.e., the polymorphism is easier protected) for RM and P AM strategies than for AM strategies. This is because under an AM strategy, the resident homozygote females discriminate against the heterozygote males carrying the rare allele. AM strategies therefore imply sexual selection against heterozygote males, whereby they stabilize the fixation equilibria and hinder protected polymorphisms.
To determine whether the polymorphism is protected under an ESS strategy of the AM configuration, the ESS time-threshold τ 2 must be substituted for t 2 in (S4.10). For ESSs of the RM and P AM configurations, the condition of protected polymorphism in (S4.3) does not depend on the ESS time-thresholds.
EXISTENCE AND STABILITY OF THE RANDOM MATING SOLUTION
We can obtain the conditions under which random mating is an evolutionarily stable mating strategy analytically using inequality (7) and checking the population genetic stability of the symmetric equilibrium (P aa ,P aA ,P AA ) = ( 1 4 , 1 2 , 1 4 ) of the Levene model. We assume h > 1 2 such that heterozygotes are at a disadvantage during ecological selection. (Note however that the RM solution exists also for h < 1 2 , in the region marked N AM S in Figure 5 , but since here heterozygotes are at an advantage so that the condition ε aa,aa ≥ ε aa,aA ≥ ε aa,AA is violated, we do not pursue the analysis of this part.)
Heterozygotes always mate at random (see the main text), and therefore it suffices to evaluate inequality (7) for the homozygote females f = aa (by symmetry, the same condition applies also to AA). For a single locus under random mating, the benefits are given by the expected viability fitness of the offspring (see Supporting Information S3); and with heterozygote disadvantage during viability selection, AA males give the least benefit to aa females so that we have E k aa = ε aa,AA = w aA = 1 − hs 1 − 1 2 s(h + 1 2 )
. where the last step can be confirmed by direct substitution of the viability fitnesses, but also follows from the fact that w aa = w AA by symmetry andw = 1. Substituting E k aa above andĒ k aa = 1 into inequality (7) yields
This condition is satisfied to the left of the curve that delimits the RM area in Figure 5 .
To establish the population genetic stability of the symmetric equilibrium under random mating, we need to evaluate the Jacobian of the population genetic recursion
where prime denotes the next generation (cf. equation (13) ; recall that under random mating, Q g,h =Q). With the three genotypes aa, aA, AA, this reads P aa = P 2 aa w 2 aa + P aa P aA w aa w aA + 1 4 P 2 aA w 2 aA P aA = P aa P aA w aa w aA + 2P aa P AA w aa w AA + 1 2 P 2 aA w 2 aA + P AA P aA w AA w aA P AA = P 2 AA w 2 AA + P AA P aA w AA w aA + 1 4 P 2 aA w 2 aA with the relative viability fitnesses from the Levene model from equation (14), w aa = 1 2 1 P aa + P aA (1 − hs) + P AA (1 − s) + 1 − s P aa (1 − s) + P aA (1 − hs) + P AA w aA = 1 2 1 − hs P aa + P aA (1 − hs) + P AA (1 − s) + 1 − hs P aa (1 − s) + P aA (1 − hs) + P AA w AA = 1 2 1 − s P aa + P aA (1 − hs) + P AA (1 − s) + 1 P aa (1 − s) + P aA (1 − hs) + P AA After some algebra, we get that the dominant eigenvalue of the Jacobian evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium (P aa ,P aA ,P AA ) = ( 1 4 , 1 2 , 1 4 ) is greater than 1, i.e., the symmetric equilibrium is unstable, if
h int gives the upper border line of the RM area in Figure 5 .
